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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case ultimately involves only one question: whether Defendants-
Respondents Ada County Sheriff Gary Raney, Ada County, and the Board of Ada 
County Commissioners (collectively, "Ada County") are responsible for the costs of 
medical care of an inmate-patient injured while in the custody of the Ada County 
Sheriff, but who is released from custody while still hospitalized so that he can 
continue to receive medical care. Plaintiff-Appellant Saint Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center ("Saint Alphonsus") submits that, pursuant to Idaho Code §20-605 
& §20-612 (which incorporates §20-605), Ada County is responsible for medical 
services provided after an inmate-patient's release from custody. 
Specifically, Saint Alphonsus seeks review of the District Court's ruling on 
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. There, the District Court held 
that Ada County was not responsible for the costs of medical care for an inmate 
released from custody for the purpose of securing additional medical care. Saint 
Alphonsus contends that, in so ruling, the District Court misinterpreted the 
governing statutes and erroneously ruled that the release from custody of an 
inmate-patient needing medical care thereby relieved Ada County of its obligation 
to pay for that inmate's medical care. Saint Alphonsus requests reversal of the 
District Court's summary judgment decision. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Saint Alphonsus brought this action against Ada County via a Verified 
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Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Complaint for Damages on March 26, 
2105, which Complaint was subsequently amended. (Record ("R."), 7-31 & 32-24.) 
Following discovery, cross-motions were filed by Ada County and Saint 
Alphonsus on August 16 and 17, 2016, respectively. (R., 53-54 & 115-116.) Hearing 
upon the cross-motions was held on September 14, 2016. (Transcript ("Tr."), 6-64.) 
The District Court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment was filed on October 25, 2016. (R., 259-268.) The Judgment 
was filed on March 2, 2017. (R., 269-270.) 
Saint Alphonsus timely filed its Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2017. (R., 271-
275.) 
C. Concise Statement of the Facts 
On January 21, 2014, I.C-T. (hereinafter "Patient"), was charged with 
domestic battery or assault in the presence of a child, Idaho Code §18-918(4), in the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, Case 
No. CR-MD-2014-0000913 ("First Criminal Case"). (R., 33 at i!5; 17; & 45 at ,r5.) 
The Patient was arraigned by video before the Ada County magistrate on January 
21, 2014. (R., 33 at i!6; 45 at ,r6.) He entered a not guilty plea and a bond of $1,000 
was set. (Id.) At the time of arraignment, he was in the custody of the Ada County 
Sheriff and incarcerated at the Ada County Jail. (Id.) He remained incarcerated at 
the Ada County Jail from that time through March 27, 2014. (Id.) 
On March 27, 2014, while still incarcerated at the Ada County Jail and in the 
Ada County Sheriffs custody, he was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a 
minor under sixteen years of age, Idaho Code §18-1506, in a separate criminal 
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matter in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Ada, Case No. CR-FE-2014-0004295 ("Second Criminal Case"). (R., 34 at i/7; 45 at 
i/7.) On that same date, March 27, 2014, the Patient attempted to commit suicide 
by hanging himself. (R., 34 at ,is; 45-46 at ,is.) He was then transported to Saint 
Alphonsus in critical condition on that same date to receive care and treatment. 
(Id.; R., 169-170, i/i/6-7.) Ultimately, due to the seriousness of the injury, he 
required care and treatment until May 24, 2014, when he was then discharged and 
released from Saint Alphonsus's care. (R., 170-174 at i/i/S-lS.) 
In the interim, a pre-trial conference in the First Criminal Case had been 
scheduled for April 3, 2014. (R., 34-35 at i/10; 22; 46 at i/10.) In the Magistrate 
Minutes/Notice of Hearing, Magistrate Judge Theresa Gardunia noted that the 
patient was recently charged with another felony and, while in custody, attempted 
suicide and was still in the hospital. (Id.) The Magistrate Judge noted that the 
State moved to "ROR" on that day, and an Order of Release was entered the same 
date (April 3, 2014). (R., 34-35 at ,r10; 22-23; 46 at if 10.) The pre-trial conference 
was then reset for thirty days out. (R., 34-35 at i/10; 22; 46 at i/10.) 
Also in the interim, on April 4, 2014, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada 
County filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Release Defendant on His Own Recognizance in 
the Second Criminal Case. (R., 34 at i/9; 19-20; 46 at ,r9.) It provided the following: 
A Complaint and Warrant were served on the Defendant, but before he 
could be arraigned on the charges, the Defendant attempted suicide. 
The Defendant is currently in critical condition at St. Alphonsus 
Hospital connected to a breathing tube. The State has been informed 
that the hospital personnel hope to transfer the Defendant to another 
facility at this time and unable to determine if he will make a full 
recovery. The State anticipates that releasing the Defendant ROR at 
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this time will allow his family to make necessary medical decisions and 
facilitate the transfer of the Defendant. The State intends to 
immediately seek reinstatement of the bond should the Defendant's 
condition improve to the point where he can be released from a medical 
care facility and arraigned on the current charges. The Defendant's 
speedy trial rights have not begun to run as he has yet to be arraigned. 
(Id.) An Order of Release was signed by Magistrate Judge James Cawthon and 
entered that same date. (R., 34 at i!9; 21; 46 at ,r9.) 
On May 5, 2014, a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Ada County filed a 
Motion to Dismiss without Prejudice of the Second Criminal Case. (R., 35 at ,r11; 
24-25; 46 at i!ll.) It provided the following: 
A Complaint and Warrant were served on the Defendant, but before he 
could be arraigned on the charges, the Defendant attempted suicide. 
The Defendant was in critical condition at St. Alphonsus Hospital 
connected to a breathing tube, and although he has somewhat 
physically improved, he is still housed at the hospital. The State has 
been informed that the hospital personnel hope to transfer the 
Defendant to Mexico for long-term care through the Mexican consulate. 
At this time it is unknown when or even if the Defendant will ever be 
competent to stand trial. The Defendant is in the country illegally and 
St. Alphonsus is eager to have him transferred to his native country. 
Should the Defendant return to the United States or be found 
competent to stand trial, the State anticipates refiling the charges. 
(Id.) An Order to Dismiss without Prejudice was then entered on May 8, 2014. (R., 
35 at ,r11; 26; 46 at i!ll.) On May 8, 2014, the State also moved to dismiss the First 
Criminal Case, and the Court dismissed it on that date. (R., 35 at ,r12; 46 at if 12.) 
The Patient ultimately incurred $304,374.92 in medical expenses/bills during 
his stay at Saint Alphonsus from March 27, 2014 through his discharge on May 24, 
2014. (R., 35-36, at i!13; 27-31; 46-47, at ill3.) These medical expenses/bills were 
submitted to Ada County for payment. (Id.) The Ada County Sheriff paid for the 
medical care and treatment provided by Saint Alphonsus through the date on which 
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both orders for Release on his Own Recognizance were entered (April 4, 2014). (Id.) 
Despite a demand from Saint Alphonsus for payment on the remaining dates of 
service, the Ada County Sheriff has refused to make any further payments relating 
to the remaining medical services even though the Patient required care and 
treatment at Saint Alphonsus through May 24, 2014. (Id.) The remaining unpaid 
balance as is in dispute in this matter, as reduced to the reimbursement rate 
specified in Title 31, Chapter 35, Idaho Code, is $97,835.18. (Id.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Saint Alphonsus identifies the following issues on appeal: 
Whether the District Court erred in holding that Ada County was not 
responsible for the medical expenses incurred for the medical care and treatment 
rendered by Saint Alphonsus to Patient from April 5, 2014 through May 24, 2014, 
and thereby granting summary judgment in favor of Ada County. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Saint Alphonsus only seeks an award of costs pursuant to I.A.R. 40. 
IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The inmate-patient at the heart of this matter was in the custody of Ada 
County on multiple felony charges when he attempted suicide. He was brought to 
Saint Alphonsus at the direction of Ada County, and was subsequently released on 
his own recognizance on an ex-parte motion to the magistrate court, to allow the 
inmate-patient to continue receiving medical care. While Ada County paid for the 
medical services for the time period that the Patient remained in-custody, it refused 
to accept responsibility for the remaining dates of services through the Patient's 
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discharge following his release on April 4th. 
As explained below, counties are generally charged, by statute (Idaho Code 
§31-3302), with responsibility for medical care expenses for individuals incarcerated 
in their jails; two more specific statutes (Idaho Code §20-605 & §20-612) address the 
particulars (including medical costs) of incarceration costs and payment therefor, In 
a 1993 decision by this Court which echoes the issues in this matter (St. Alphonsus 
Reg'l Med'l Ctr., Ltd. v. Killeen, infra), it was held that these statutes "collectively 
indicate that it is ultimately the sheriffs responsibility to pay for prisoners' medical 
expenses." In doing so, this Court held that, under the then-existing versions of the 
statutes, that counties were responsible for all costs incurred for medical care, but 
only while the inmate was in-custody. 
The Legislature amended the statutes the following year to address the 
result in Killeen. While still obligating the counties to pay for inmate medical care, 
it provided a trade-off of sorts to address the seemingly harsh outcomes in Killeen 
that impacted both parties (the counties and medical providers): instead of full 
payment of medical costs, counties would now only have to pay a reduced 
reimbursement rate such as paid in medical indigency matters, but counties would 
now remain on the hook for medical costs after inmates were released for the 
purpose of receiving medical care. These adjustments were expressly added to 
Idaho Code §20-605, and Idaho Code §20-612 was amended to cross-reference and 
incorporate the provisions of §20-605 regarding medical costs. Importantly, the 
Legislature did not amend these statutes to replace them with the more complicated 
and cumbersome medical indigency process. 
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In ruling upon summary judgment in this matter, the District Court held 
that §20-605 did not apply to Patient's post-release medical costs, finding that §20-
605 only applied to inmates housed for the benefit of another county. In doing so, 
however, the District Court erred in not recognizing that the provisions regarding 
payment of medical costs (including payment for medical costs post-release) were 
expressly incorporated into the statute governing inmates (such as Patient) housed 
in the same county in which they are ordered to be held: §20-612. Further, the 
District Court erred in finding that post-release costs for same-county inmates 
were, instead, covered by Idaho's medical indigency program (Title 31, Chapter 35), 
an argument rejected by the Killeen court, a conclusion not otherwise altered by the 
Legislature's 1994 amendments. 
For these reasons, as discussed further below, the District Court erred in its 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, which 
decision should be reversed and the matter remanded to the District Court. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In an appeal from an order of summary judgment, this Court's standard of 
review is the same as the standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for 
summary judgment." Infanger v. City of Salmon, 137 Idaho 45, 46-47, 44 P.3d 1100, 
1101-02 (2002)(citation omitted). "All disputed facts are to be construed liberally in 
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from 
the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Id. at 47. "Summary 
judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
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material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law." Id. "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law 
remains, over which this Court exercises free review." Id. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Code §§20-605, 20-612, and 31-3302, and the Killeen decision. 
1. The statutes at issue. 
The determination of a county's obligation to reimburse a hospital (here, 
Saint Alphonsus) for medical care provided to an inmate is set out in a number of 
statutes. 
First, Idaho Code §31-3302(3) provides for the County's general obligation to 
make such reimbursements: 
31-3302. County charges enumerated. The following are county 
charges: 
(3) The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons 
charged with or convicted of crime and committed therefor to the 
county jail. Provided that any medical expenses shall be paid at the 
rate of reimbursement as provided in chapter 35, title 31[1], Idaho 
Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established by 
contract or agreement. 
In turn, Idaho Code §20-605 addresses how a County is to specifically address 
costs of confinement, including medical costs, as follows in salient part: 
20-605. Costs of confinement. The county wherein any court has 
entered an order pursuant to section 20-604, Idaho Code, shall pay all 
direct and indirect costs of the detention or confinement of the person 
1 Chapter 35, Title 31 relates to Idaho's medical indigency laws, which provides for the 
method by which providers are reimbursed for medical services provided to indigent county 
patients. For purposes of this appeal and the statutes at issue, the salient portion of the 
medical indigency laws referred to - the rate of reimbursement - is Idaho Code §31-
3502(23), which defines the "reimbursement rate" applicable to medical indigency matters. 
At present, the "reimbursement rate" is 95% of the unadjusted medicaid rate. 
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to the governmental unit or agency owning or operating the jail or 
confinement facilities in which the person was confined or detained .... 
In the absence of such agreement or order fixing the cost as provided in 
section 20-606, Idaho Code, the charge for each person confined or 
detained shall be the sum of thirty-five dollars ($35.00) per day, plus 
the cost of any medical or dental services paid at the rate of 
reimbursement as provided in chapter 35, title 31, Idaho Code, unless 
a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established by contract or 
agreement; provided, however, that the county may determine whether 
the detained or confined person is eligible for any local, state, federal 
or private program that covers dental, medical and/or burial expenses. 
That person will be required to apply for those benefits, and any such 
benefits obtained may be applied to the detained or confined person's 
incurred expenses, and in the event of the death of such detained or 
confined person, the county wherein the court entered the order shall 
pay all actual burial costs. Release from an order pursuant to 
section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person 
receiving medical treatment shall not relieve the county of its 
obligation of paying the medical care expenses imposed in this 
section .... 
(emphasis added).2 
Importantly - and key in this appeal - Idaho Code §20-612, next in turn, also 
directs the County to pay for medical services for inmates, by reference to §20-605: 
20-612. Reception and board of prisoners. The sheriff must receive all 
persons committed to jail by competent authority except mentally ill 
persons not charged with a crime and juveniles. It shall be the duty of 
the board of county commissioners to furnish all persons committed to 
the county jail with necessary food, clothing and bedding, and 
medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code, and the 
board of county commissioners is authorized to pay therefor out of the 
2 As an aside, that the Patient was held per LC. §20-604 ("Any district judge or magistrate 
may order a person confined or detained .. . in any county or municipal jail or other 
confinement facility within the judicial district in which the court is located.") is obvious 
(R., 17), given the "any" language of the statute and this Court's recent emphasis on 
applying laws as plainly written. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011)("'[W]here a statute or constitutional provision is plain, 
clear, and unambiguous, it 'speaks for itself and must be given the interpretation the 
language clearly implies."'); accord, Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868, 882, 380 P.3d 681, 
695 (2016)(" This Court does not have the authority to modify an unambiguous legislative 
enactment.") 
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county treasury under such rules and regulations as they may 
prescribe. 
(emphasis added). 
As explained herein, these statutes make clear - contrary to the District 
Court's determination - that counties are obligated to make payment for inmates' 
medical care provided by providers such as Saint Alphonsus, even when those 
inmate-patients are released from custody to receive medical care. 
2. The Killeen decision and subsequent amendment of the 
statutes at issue. 
Underlying the question of the governing statute regarding reimbursement 
for medical care provided to a patient-inmate is the question of what 
reimbursement is owed when an inmate is released from custody to receive medical 
care. This question was previously presented to this Court in the case of St. 
Alphonsus Reg'l Med'l Ctr., Ltd. v. Killeen, 124 Idaho 197, 858 P.2d 736 
(l993)("Killeen"). 
In Killeen, a somewhat factually similar case to the instant one, an individual 
was arrested on an Ada County bench warrant in Canyon County, and transported 
to Ada County. While in custody, the inmate required medical care and was 
brought to Saint Alphonsus; while still receiving care, she was released from 
custody on her own recognizance. A dispute between Saint Alphonsus and Ada 
County arose as to whether Ada County had to pay for all amounts incurred for 
medical care (including those costs incurred after the inmate-patient's release from 
custody) and whether Idaho's medical indigency laws (Title 31, Chapter 35) 
governed the reimbursement of medical care expenses to Saint Alphonsus. 
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Under the then-existing version of Idaho Code §31-3302, no reference was 
made to medical costs, but it did make the "county responsible for all expenses 
'necessarily incurred in the support of those persons in the county jail."' 124 Idaho 
at 199. Because of this, the Killeen court concluded that it was "clear that Idaho 
law places on the county the financial responsibility for all persons maintained in 
the county jail." Id. 
In attempting to avoid responsibility for the medical costs, Ada County 
pointed to the then-existing version of Idaho Code §20-612, arguing that it was 
silent on medical expenses, thereby limiting the meaning of §31-3302. Id. 
However, the Killeen court concluded that the listed items in §20-612 was not an 
exclusive list, and did not limit §31-3302's meaning. Id. The Killeen court further 
looked to the language of Idaho Code §20-605 (which did, at the time, specifically 
address medical costs), noting that it obligated a county from which a confinement 
order had issued to reimburse the actual costs incurred for the medical care of the 
inmate to the county that actually housed the prisoner. Id. The Killeen court went 
on to also note that Idaho Code §20-605 allowed for the determination of whether an 
inmate was eligible for outside benefits that might cover those costs, and requiring 
inmates to apply for such benefits so as to be applied to the inmate-patient's 
incurred expenses. Id. In light of these provisions, the Killeen court found that 
Idaho Code §20-605 provided "guidance by analogy for finding that the county in 
which the prisoner is detained is obligated to pay and shows that the legislature 
contemplated that the county generally would pay medical expenses and then, m 
appropriate situations, be reimbursed." Id. 
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Given this, the Killeen court ruled that Ada County was responsible for all 
medical costs incurred while an inmate was in custody: 
We are sympathetic to Ada County's policy arguments against being 
responsible for medical expenses-the anomaly being that when an 
indigent is in jail, the hospital recovers more money than it would 
under the indigency scheme and the reality that the sheriffs office is 
not ordinarily so constituted to seek indemnity from other sources. 
Nonetheless, the statutes collectively indicate that it is ultimately the 
sheriffs responsibility to pay for prisoners' medical expenses. Re-
allocation of that responsibility is within the province of the 
legislature. 
Because the statutes provide that the sheriff and the county are 
responsible only for those in their custody, a fortiori the county need 
not pay for an inmate's medical expenses incurred after that person is 
no longer in custody. We thus affirm the trial court's judgment denying 
St. Alphonsus those medical expenses incurred after Edmonds was 
released on her own recognizance. Because of our disposition, we need 
not address the question of whether a contract for payment existed. 
Killeen, 124 Idaho at 199. Thus, the primary outcomes in the Killeen decision were 
twofold: 1) the county was responsible for full reimbursement of the incurred 
medical expenses, but 2) only as long as the patient was actually in custody. 
However, after Killeen, the key statutes at issue in both that matter and this 
matter - §31-3302, §20-612, & §20-605 - were variously amended, to ameliorate 
both of these outcomes. Reference to medical costs was woven into Idaho Code §31-
3302 and §20-612 (itself referring to §20-605); §20-605 was amended to require 
payment for medical costs where an inmate was released to receive medical care; 
and §31-3302 and §20-605 were revised to save counties money by limiting 
payments to the reimbursement rate found in Idaho's medical indigency laws. 
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Specifically, the following amended language was added: 
• Idaho Code §20-605: 
In the absence of such agreement or order fixing the cost as provided in 
section 20-606, Idaho Code, the charge for each person confined or 
detained shall be the sum of thirty-five dollars ($35.00) per day, plus 
the actual cost of any medical or dental services paid at the unadjusted 
medicaid rate of reimbursement as provided in section 31-3502(4), 
Idaho Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise established by 
contract or agreement; . . . Release from an order pursuant to 
section 20-604, Idaho Code, for the purpose of a person receiving 
medical treatment shall not relieve the county of its obligation of 
paying the medical care expenses imposed in this section. 
• Idaho Code §20-612: 
It shall be the duty of the board of county commissioners to furnish all 
persons committed to the county jail with necessary food, clothing and 
bedding, and medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code, 
• Idaho Code §31-3302: 
(3) The expenses necessarily incurred in the support of persons 
charged with or convicted of crime and committed therefor to the 
county jail. Provided that any medical expenses shall be paid at the 
unadjusted Medicaid rate of reimbursement as provided in section 31-
3502(4), Idaho Code, unless a rate of reimbursement is otherwise 
established by contract or agreement. 
(R., 146-147.)3 In light of these amendments, the two-fold primary outcomes from 
Killeen are no longer possible. Now, instead, 1) a county obtains the benefit of the 
lower reimbursement rate utilized in the medical indigency system, but 2) is still 
responsible for medical care when a patient-inmate is released for purposes of 
3 These are the 1994 amendments. Additional amendments were made to Idaho Code §31-
3302 and §20-605 in 2009 and 2011 to further harmonize the language regarding the actual 
rate of payment with that of the medical indigency program. 
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receiving medical care. 
B. The District Court erred in failing to correctly apply Idaho Code §20-
612. 
The thrust of the District Court's decision was, simply, that §20-605 is 
inapplicable with respect to the Patient's care, because the Patient was no longer in 
custody at the time the medical care was provided, and because the patient was not 
housed in a different county: 
Section 20-605 only applies to inmates housed in a different county. 
The question was decided in Bannock County. v. City of Pocatello, 110 
Idaho 292, 715 P.2d 962 (1986). In that case, the Court was asked to 
decide whether the City of Pocatello was liable to Bannock County for 
incarceration costs at the Bannock County Jail. ... The Court 
explained: 
"LC. §20-604, as amended, enables a district judge or 
magistrate to order prisoners confined in any county jail 
in that judicial district, or in any other county if an 
agreement to that effect exists between the counties. I. C. 
§20-605, as amended, defines which county is responsible 
for the cost of jailing the prisoners in another county." 
Id. at 294 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court concluded: "A more 
reasonable alternative to the county's interpretation is that I.C. §§20-
604, -605 and -606 are specific statutes which pertain only to the 
housing of prisoners in another county, while LC. §20-612 applies to 
prisoners housed within the county." Id. at 295. 
Here, it is undisputed that the Patient was both ordered confined and 
actually held in custody by Ada County. It is also undisputed that Ada 
County was responsible for the costs of medical care while the Patient 
was in custody. This is mandated under section 31-3302, as the Patient 
was a charge of the County. This is also mandated by section 20-
612, which applies to prisoners housed within their own 
county. Section 20-605 simply does not apply. 
(R., 264)(emphasis added). However, the District Court's analysis abruptly and 
inexplicably terminates here, without further analysis of §20-612. 
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Saint Alphonsus agrees that Idaho Code §20-605 governs out-of-county 
inmates, and that §20-612 governs same-county inmates. However, in this instance 
- and with any same-county inmates - §20-605 expressly governs reimbursement 
for medical costs because §20-612 specifically references LC. §20-605 with respect to 
payment of medical costs: 
20-612. Reception and board of prisoners. The sheriff must receive all 
persons committed to jail by competent authority except mentally ill 
persons not charged with a crime and juveniles. It shall be the duty of 
the board of county commissioners to furnish all persons committed to 
the county jail with necessary food, clothing and bedding, and 
medical care as provided in section 20-605, Idaho Code, and the 
board of county commissioners is authorized to pay therefor out of the 
county treasury under such rules and regulations as they may 
prescribe. 
(emphasis added); see BHC Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cty., 150 Idaho 93, 96, 
244 P.3d 237, 240 (2010)("This Court has held that when one statute references 
another, only the portion that 'relates to the particular subject of the adopting 
act, and ... is applicable and appropriate thereto' is incorporated.")(emphases in 
original); accord, In re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 681, 183 P.3d 765, 769 
(2008)("Where one statute adopts the particular provisions of another by a specific 
and descriptive reference to the statute or provisions adopted, the effect is the 
same as though the statute or provisions adopted had been incorporated 
bodily into the adopting statute.")(emphasis added)(quoting Nampa & Meridian 
Irrig. Distr.,v. Barker, 38 Idaho 529, 223 P. 529 (1924)). 
Thus, Idaho Code §31-3302 provides the general recognition that counties are 
responsible for the costs of medical care provided to inmates in their custody, and 
Idaho Code §§20-605 and 20-612 specifically outline how such costs are going to be 
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covered and reimbursed for out-of-county inmates and in-county inmates, 
respectively. In turn, §20-612's reference and incorporation of §20-605 pulls over 
three significant provisions regarding medical costs: 1) utilization of the medical 
indigency reimbursement rate4; 2) securing reimbursement from inmates based 
upon potential benefits available to those inmates; and 3) most salient here, that a 
release from custody for medical care does not terminate a county's obligation to pay 
for such care. Thus, bluntly, by the plain language of §20-605 (as incorporated via 
§20-612), Ada County was obligated to pay for Patient's care after his release to 
receive additional medical care. 
Accordingly, in light of the District Court's error in not finding that Idaho 
Code §20-605 was incorporated into §20-612 and thereby applicable to the medical 
care provided to the Patient post-release, the District Court's summary judgment 
decision should be reversed. 
C. Idaho's medical indigency program does not supplant the County's 
obligation to pay for medical care for inmates. 
In granting summary judgment to Ada County and denying Saint Alphonsus' 
4 Which Ada County availed itself of in paying for Patient's in-custody care. Ada County 
contended that such reduced-rate payments were made based only upon §31-3302 (R., 253-
254) rather than §20-605. Of course, §31-3302 is a general statute, broadly outlining costs 
for which counties are responsible; for example, §31-3302 advises that counties are 
responsible for "[t]he necessary expenses [for] the indigent sick ... whose support is 
chargeable to the county." §31-3302(7). Of course, the more specific statutes addressing 
the medical indigency process are exhaustively set out elsewhere, in Chapter 35 of Title 31. 
The County's position - that §31-3302 as a general statute prevails over more specific 
statutes - not only contradicts rote rules of statutory construction, but also cherry-picks 
what statutes Ada County prefers to have referenced and incorporated. See, e.g., First Fed. 
Sav. Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g. Inc., 154 Idaho 626, 632, 301 P.3d 632, 638 
(2012)("Where two statutes appear to apply to the same subject matter, the specific statute 
will control over the more general statute.") Ada County cannot, on the one hand, avail 
itself to the reference and incorporation of Title 31, Chapter 31 in §31-3302, but then refuse 
to acknowledge the reference and incorporation of §20-605 into §20-612. 
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cross-motion, the District Court also held that medical care for patient-inmates 
post-release would be governed under the medical indigency program: 
The sheriff and the county remain responsible for the payment to 
prisoner medical care, indigent or not, but only at the Medicaid rate. If 
an indigent prisoner is ordered to be confined in his or her own county, 
then that county will still be liable for an indigent prisoner's medical 
costs after release, but through the indigency statutes, Idaho Code 
§31-3501 et seq. 
(R., 266.) This is erroneous. 
As discussed above, the amendments to the statutes at issue addressed the 
two primary outcomes of the Killeen case, regarding the rate of payment, and 
whether to reimburse for inmates released from custody. However, in Killeen, Ada 
County had also argued, as here, that the medical indigency program was the 
correct reimbursement process, an argument this Court rejected: 
Ada County counters with its contention that the statutory scheme for 
obtaining reimbursement for medical services to indigents applies to 
all indigents, including those in the sheriffs custody, and that, in the 
instant situation of an indigent pre-trial detainee, that scheme is the 
mechanism by which the legislature intended care providers to seek 
payment. See Idaho Code tit. 31, ch. 35 (1983). 
We agree with St. Alphonsus that the Idaho Code contemplates that 
when a person is in the sheriffs custody, whether indigent or not, the 
sheriff and custodial county are responsible for payment of medical 
expenses incurred. 
We are sympathetic to Ada County's policy arguments against being 
responsible for medical expenses-the anomaly being that when an 
indigent is in jail, the hospital recovers more money than it would 
under the indigency scheme and the reality that the sheriffs office is 
not ordinarily so constituted to seek indemnity from other sources. 
Nonetheless, the statutes collectively indicate that it is ultimately the 
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sheriffs responsibility to pay for prisoners' medical expenses. Re-
allocation of that responsibility is within the province of the 
legislature. 
Killeen, 124 Idaho at 198-99. In fact, Killeen came to this Court on review from a 
Court of Appeals decision erroneously concluding (as the District Court similarly 
did here) that Idaho's medical indigency laws governed in-custody inmates' medical 
care, a conclusion rejected by this Court in Killeen. 124 Idaho at 200 ("Nonetheless, 
the statutes collectively indicate that it is ultimately the sheriffs responsibility to 
pay for prisoners' medical expenses."); compare with St. Alphonsus Regional 
Medical Center, Ltd. v. Killeen, 124 Idaho 221, 858 P.2d 760 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Moreover, Killeen clearly notes that medical expenses are the obligation of 
the incarcerating county and not other Idaho counties, a holding that would 
otherwise be incompatible under Chapter 35 were Idaho's medical indigency 
program to apply. This is because under Chapter 35, an obligated county is only 
responsible for the first $11,000 in medical bills, and the Catastrophic Health Care 
fund, which derives its funds from all counties in Idaho, would be responsible for all 
costs exceeding $11,000. See LC. §31-3502(5), -3503, -3503A, -3517. 
Further, in addition to clashing with the holding in Killeen, imposition of the 
medical indigency process on providers such as Saint Alphonsus would impose 
additional burdens that are nowhere found in Title 20 and plainly not contemplated 
by the Legislature. As is made clear above, all that is envisioned under Title 20 is 
that if medical services are provided, then the jailing county will pay for such 
expenses even after a patient is released from custody. By instead insisting that 
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medical indigency is the correct course for inmate-patient post-release care, the 
District Court would instead incorrectly be forcing providers to undertake the 
burden of not only undertaking, but also proving, a medical indigency case 
(generously assuming cooperation by the inmate-patient in submitting needed 
information and documentation demanded by the County)5 - no small burden given 
the requirements of the medical indigency statutes (see generally Idaho Code §§31-
3501 et seq.), and, again, something plainly not contemplated in §31-3302, §20-605, 
and/or §20-612.6 
Thus, the District Court's conclusion that Idaho's medical indigency system 
supplanted the counties' payment obligations for post-release inmate-patients under 
Title 20 directly contradicts the plain language of the statutes at issue, and is in 
error, especially in light of this Court's rejection of a similar argument in Killeen. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the District Court's October 25, 2016 
Memorandum Decision and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment, 
granting summary judgment to Ada County, and, in turn, denying Saint Alphonsus' 
5 A prima facie case for proving medical indigency has long been settled, and consists of (1) 
residency in the obligated county; (2) indigency from a standpoint of lack of resources; and 
(3) medical necessity of the treatment. Mercy Med. Center v. Ada County, 146 Idaho 226, 
230, 192 P.3d 1050, 1054 (2008). 
6 Further, under Idaho's medical indigency statutes, there is no guarantee (contrary to as 
suggested by the District Court) that the incarcerating county would, in fact, be the 
'obligated county,' given that medical indigency determines the 'obligated county' based 
upon an analysis of duration of residency in a particular county. See Idaho Code §31-3506. 
Thus, for example, a Wallace resident, arrested and jailed in Ada County and then 
receiving medical care from Saint Alphonsus, would not result in payment from Ada 
County; instead, Saint Alphonsus would need to initiate medical indigency proceedings 
with Shoshone County. 
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motion for summary judgment, should be reversed and remanded to the District 
Court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of August, 2017. 
DUKE SCANLAN & HALL, PLLC 
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